My limited knowledge on the subject of Naval strategy is probably 20+ years out of date, but I was always under the assumption that the purpose of a Navy was pretty straight forward. The ability to control and command the Sea Lines of Communication when and where needed via force projection. Everything else, was secondary to this primary mission.
Thanks for pointing this out, and I am glad that these questions are being asked. I think there are two major elements that neither article really talks about but have a huge impact on the topic of Fleet Size.
1. The growing Super Power status and aggressive posture of China towards Naval affairs such as in Taiwan and the South China Sea.
2. The perception of shrinking US power and growing isolationism within US political culture. This leads to a declining interest in commanding and controlling Sea Lines of Communication.
The biggest hinderance to McGarth's strategy is political, and the primary hinderance to Work's strategy will be institutional. The fact of the matter is that the US has big priorities to juggle right now, and there is no clear cut political will one direction or the other. If anything, this political paralysis will impact the discussion more than McGarth or Work's talking points. I think this quote in McGarth's piece is the core of it....
Until such time as we retreat from world leadership into something other than where we see ourselves today, we will continue to need a larger Navy doing much of what it is asked to do, but more of it.
There is a not insignificant portion of the electorate on both sides of the political divide that would like to see the US retreat from world leadership which would than allow for and embrace Work's thesis.