Been slacking in my WWI reading and study. The Guns of August took me far longer than it should have, and I think that kind of killed my reading and studying momentum.
After finishing the last Gaunt's Ghosts book earlier in March, I decided it was time to jump back into the First World War. I took a look at the WWI timeline to see what was going on in March of 1915, and discovered we were about to hit the centenary of the failed Allied (mostly British) attempt to force the Dardanelles Strait and open a new front in the war, this one against Turkey. It just so happened that I have a book on my shelf about this very incident, so in I jumped!
In The Dardanelles Disaster: Winston Churchill's Greatest Failure, author Dan Van der Vat describes the Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles Strait, from the events leading up to the decision to launch the attack through the aftermath of said attack. This book can really be divided up into three sections, I think:
1) The events that lead to the Admiralty's (read: Winston Churchill's) decision to force the Strait. Van der Vat covers in detail the flight of the Goeben and Breslau, the two German ships whose journey through the Mediterranean and ultimately to Constantinople put shame to both the British and French fleets. This action served to bring the Ottoman Empire into the war on Germany and Austria's side, which effectively cut the Russians off from their only relevant warm-water access to the rest of the world. After the failures on the Western Front and the subsequent entrenchment of forces there, coupled with the need to help relieve pressure on Russia, the plan to force the Strait was born. (Interestingly, in Sean McMeekin's The Russian Origins of the First World War, McMeekin describes the Dardanelles operation as an attack to relieve the pressure on the Russians as well--but it was an operation the Russians led the Allies into, and never really lifted a finger to help).
2) The attack itself, very well-described by Van der Vat and full of interesting detail about British ships of the day. There is also a chapter discussing the Gallipoli campaign in brief, as it was a tragic epilogue to the failed naval operation in the Strait.
3) The consequences of the failed attack, from the more immediate (prolonging of WWI) to the more distant (fall of the Ottoman Empire, creation of Turkey, and the state of the modern Middle East in general).
On the whole, I though this was a good book. It got off to a bit of a slow start with a detailed description of how the Goeben and Breslau eluded the British and French forces in the Mediterranean, and the subsequent planning of the operation in the Dardanelles. Van der Vat takes great pains to point out that British military doctrine over the entire 19th Century was that the only way to force the Dardanelles was through a combined land and sea attack, involving troops (LOTS of troops) on the Gallipoli Peninsula supported by naval forces in the Strait. The Dardanelles was just too well-defended by emplaced forts on the European and Asian sides, as well as mobile artillery batteries (which wreaked havoc on the British ships), mines, and land-based torpedo tubes. On top of this, Horatio Nelson had once said it was folly to allow ships to attack land-based defensive installations. The venerable Herbert Kitchener, who was damn near a god in the British military, declared no troops could be spared for the Dardanelles operation due to the heavy requirements of the Western Front. Despite all of the above evidence, Churchill got it in his mind that the British Navy would be able to force the Strait and conduct a "naval cavalry charge" across the Sea of Marmara, level their guns at Constantinople, and get the Ottoman Empire to capitulate.
The result was a disaster. The operation was poorly planned, poorly led, and poorly executed, although there were some bright spots of tactical genius and personal bravery under fire.
Where the book starts to come off the rails, I think, is in the discussion of the events after the failed attack. While it is interesting to see the near-term effects of the failure--Churchill's fall from grace, the tragedy of Gallipoli, and the effect on the overall course of the war--some of the author's further conclusions are a bit of a stretch. Undoubtedly, WWI had profound effect on the shape of the modern Middle East, but how much of that stemmed from the British failure at the Dardanelles is questionable. To be sure, that failed operation led to the failed Gallipoli invasion, where a Turkish lieutenant colonel named Mustafa Kemal made a name for himself in defending Turkish soil from the invaders. Kemal would go on to become Atat